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ABSTRACT 
Passwords, particularly text-based, are the most common authentication mechanisms across all platforms 
and services like computers, mobiles, web and network services. Existing password strength evaluators 
and online service providers (Gmail, Yahoo, Paypal, Twitter, etc) password strength estimators determine 
the effectiveness of passwords chosen by user based on entropy techniques or a similar function of the 
parameters: length, complexity and predictability. Such implementations often ignore passwords part of 
publicly available password dictionaries and password leaks which are often the primary choice for 
malicious adversaries and particularly script kiddies. This paper presents an application that would help in 
preventing the use of such passwords thereby reducing the impact of dictionary based password attacks 
significantly. The application maintains a database of unique passwords by gathering publicly available 
password dictionaries and passwords leaked over the Internet. The application provides users with an 
interface to query the database and verify if their passwords are already available on the Internet thereby 
preventing them from the use of such passwords. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Passwords are the primary choice for authenticating users and are likely to remain for a significant 
amount of time in the future [1] [2] because of the practicality and convenience aspects associated with 
them for service providers and end- users respectively. Qualys [3] identified password guessing attacks as 
a top cyber security risk after analyzing attack data from TippingPoint intrusion prevention systems 
deployed for protecting 6000 organizations. 
A pre-known list of passwords is gathered together to form a password dictionary tile. Dictionary attacks 
leverage such password dictionaries and automate the attempt of breaking in to password-protected 
applications and systems by trying each word/password listed in the password dictionary. Dictionary 
based password cracking is easy to execute and almost every password cracking tool is bundled with a 
pre-built dictionary thereby aiding script-kiddies in performing dictionary based password attacks. 
Attackers build comprehensive password dictionaries by compiling passwords from various dictionaries 
and password leaks. 
Alexander Lystad analyzed password leaks from password attacks on Rockyou and phpBB [4], and 
observed that the percentage of unique passwords that can be cracked using common well-defined 
dictionaries (like John-The-Ripper, Cain & Abel, etc) is 33.41 % and 39.43% respectively. The analysis 
indicates the necessity of enabling users to be aware of such passwords and thereby prevent them from 
using those passwords. With passwords being the most common form of authentication and a critical 
aspect of identifying users while providing necessary privacy, password based attacks and defense 
systems are subjects of ongoing research. 
The primary goal of this project is to build a database of unique passwords from publicly available 
password dictionaries and passwords leaked over the internet, and implement an application that would 
allow regular users and administrators to verify if their passwords are susceptible to dictionary attacks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review which 
details existing work in authentication mechanisms particularly passwords and dictionary attacks (their 
detection, prevention and response systems). Section 3 details the design and implementation aspects of 
the application developed. Section 4 presents statistics related to password dictionaries, leaks and attacks. 
Section 5 and 6 discuss future work and conclusion respectively. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Linux pluggable authentication module (PAM) pam_cracklib [5] incorporates a similar approach to the 
proposed as it is used to test passwords against dictionary words. The Linux pam_cracklib module allows 
system administrators to incorporate strength checking for user passwords against a system dictionary 
followed by a set of password policies [5]. The drawbacks of pam_cracklib module are poor 
documentation, limited implementation (few *nix distributions) and that it is primarily aimed for use by 
system administrators [6]. 
Saikat Chakrabarti and Mukesh Singha! present an analysis of existing dictionary attack prevention 
techniques and their drawbacks. They discuss about encrypted key exchange based protocols for 
protection against oftline dictionary attacks. For thwarting online dictionary attacks, they discuss account 
lockout, delayed response, extra computations and Reverse Turing Tests (RTT) [7]. The Password-based 
Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) by Steven Bellovin and Michael Merritt incorporates a combination of 
cryptographic schemes to prevent oftline dictionary attacks but it was later observed that the EKE and 
variants of EKE protocols are vulnerable to plain text equivalence which would allow an adversary to 
masquerade as a victim by using his hashed password captured through eavesdropping [8] [9]. Delayed 
responses and account locking are common countermeasures for online dictionary attacks as they reduce 
the number of passwords that can be guessed in a given time and lock the user account after reaching a 
threshold set for failed login attempts. However, as outlined by Pinkas et. al these countermeasures can 
result in denial of service and increased customer service costs as a result of account locking. Further, an 
attacker can try multiple login attempts in parallel with different user accounts to circumvent delayed 
response and account lockout countermeasures [I]. The extra computation based technique involves the 
inclusion of non- trivial computation in addition to providing the password. The idea of such a technique 
is to incorporate a large overhead for password attack tools as it would require computation for every 
login attempt thereby reducing the number of attempts significantly. The extra computation technique 
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might present usability issues for a legitimate user while an adversary can tackle the overhead by using a 
powerful attack machine or environment [7]. Pinkas et al. use a similar approach by incorporating RTT 
technique to prevent automated programs from carrying out dictionary attacks. In this approach, the user 
needs to present his password and pass the RTT to ensure a successful login [I]. However, it was 
observed by Stuart Stubblebine and Paul van Oorschot that the RTT-based implementation is prone to 
RTT relay attacks [7]. Several real world RTTs (also called as CAPTCHAs which refer to Completely 
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) implemented by popular online 
service providers have been broken in the past using computer character recognition based projects [IO], 
[11] [12] [13].
Techniques for improving authentication or protection against password attacks in general range from 
hardware based solutions, biometric authentication, client certificate mechanisms, graphical password 
schemes, grid based logins, multi- factor authentication etc [I]. Pinkas et. al present a range of such 
existing authentication mechanisms and drawbacks associated with them [1], which are discussed as 
follows. The hardware and biometric based authentication solutions form a robust authentication 
technique but also include a range of drawbacks like additional costs and overhead associated with the 
need for additional devices and migration from traditional password based authentication. Additionally, 
hardware based authentication solutions also involve usability issues as a result of losing or forgetting 
device. Multi-factor authentication schemes often combine passwords (something you know) with 
hardware (something you have) or biometric solutions (something you are) and hence demonstrate the 
same drawbacks as of hardware and biometric solutions along with other convenience issues. Client 
certificates is another solution that implements a software based authentication approach but include 
drawbacks associated with key portability and storage. 
There are a vast number of password strength evaluating applications available over the Internet that 
assist users in determining the strength of the passwords chosen by them [ 14]. Examples for such 
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password evaluating applications are Password Strength Checker at passwordmeter.com [24], GeodSoft 
Password Evaluator [ 15], GetSecurePassword [16], How Secure is My Password? [ 17], etc. Further, 
almost every online service provider implements a password strength indicator to allow users to gauge the 
strength of their password while setting up a new account or changing their existing password. Serge 
Egelman et. al observed that password strength meters result in stronger password selection by users for 
important accounts [ 18] but these online password strength determining tools and password strength 
meters do not take publicly released passwords into consideration while determining the strength of user 
chosen password. 
The Online Domain Tools team analyzed common password strength evaluating tools available over the 
Internet and noted that entropy and complexity are the primary strength determination parameters while 
only a few tools considered dictionary attacks [14]. Online domain tools incorporate dictionary attack 
based password strength determination application [19] on their website where they break down 
passwords, observe the presence of regular dictionary words or parts of it, the presence of leetspeak and 
other pattern analysis techniques but the application doesn't consider publicly available passwords. 
Online services like pwnedlist.com [20] and shouldichangemypasswordnow.com [21] obtain the user's 
email address and _verify if their accounts have ever been compromised based on emails and passwords 
gathered from password leaks over the internet. These services inform the user about the presence of their 
passwords in public on the basis of their email address. The passwords from dictionaries and leaks that 
are not associated with any emails are ignored by these services and hence do not prevent users from 
using passwords already available on the Internet. 
Another online project leakdb by Abusix states gathering leaked and publicly available human generated 
hashes as its objective [22]. This project is similar to the concept demonstrated in this paper but it is 
different from the application presented in this paper for the following reasons. The leakdb project 
maintains a database of hashes available over the Internet. It takes a hashed value as input and reports the 
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corresponding clear text if it is present in the leakdb database. The project only stores cracked hashes in 
the database thereby missing leaked hashes (available on the internet) that haven't been cracked yet. Also, 
it doesn't consider passwords from common password dictionaries and passwords leaked in plain text 
over the Internet. Further, querying uncracked hashes results in submission of such hashes to leakdb 
password cracking feature without notifying the user about such an implementation prior to querying. 
This presents a risk to the users as their password is added to the leakdb search database after being 
cracked. 
The various limitations in terms of costs, usability, awareness, etc. associated with alternate 
authentication schemes often result in users sticking with the traditional password based authentication 
schemes. These alternate authentication schemes and password attack defense systems require selection 
of a regular password and an additional item (something you have/something you are). Dictionary attacks 
can be tackled at the root level by aiding the users in selecting passwords that are relatively less prone to 
dictionary attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate a technique that aims at equipping users with a 
dictionary attack based password evaluation system thereby encouraging them to avoid publicly available 
passwords and preventing them from being simple targets. 
6 
------- ~---- - - - - - --------------- - --
3 APPLICATION DETAILS 
3.1 Application 
The application built comprises of a user interface, a database and helper components. The database for 
this application primarily contains schemas for each hash value supported by the application. These 
schemas maintain the database of passwords gathered from various password leaks and dictionaries over 
time. The database also has a submission schema that is responsible for maintaining database of user 
input ranging from feedback to information about password leaks and dictionaries. The user interface is a 
web application that provides a search bar in order to allow users to input passwords and query the 
presence of their password in the password database. The helper components of the application are 
responsible for working behind the scenes to facilitate gathering of password dictionary or leak sources 
and import passwords into the password database. The web application was built on PHP backed by a 
MySQL database. The helper components (importer, harvester and statster) were implemented in python. 
The helper components are discussed next in this section. 
3.2 Helper Components 
I) Importer: The importer component of the application is responsible for obtaining passwords from a
file (password dictionary or password leak) and importing each password into the database. The user 
passes the following parameters to the importer utility: FILENAME, FORMAT, FILETYPE, DATE and 
URL. Passwords in the password dictionary or leak are typically in the same format - plaintext or a hash 
type. This input type (plaintext or hash) of passwords is provided by the FORMAT parameter. The 
Fl LETYPE parameter refers to the type of the password file and it is either of leak type or dictionary type. 
The DA TE parameter, as the name implies, refers to the date on which the security breach happened or 
the date the passwords were released to public. The URL parameter can either be a media post about the 
breach or the location where the password leak or dictionary are hosted. 
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2) Harvester: The harvester component of the application is responsible for searching and harvesting
information about password dictionaries, security breaches and password leaks. The harvester component 
is a collection of scripts that generate an output file with URLs of potential password dictionaries, 
password leaks or information associated with them. 
3) Statster: Statster is a collection of scripts used for generating statistics outlined in Table 1. These
scripts calculate the total number of entries contributed by a leak or a dictionary to the database and the 
crackability aspects. The crackability aspect for online service providers (like Google) or password 
strength estimating websites (like passwordmeter.com) refer to the percentage of passwords (in a leak 
file) that were identified as weak by those online service providers or password strength estimating 
websites while for a password database (built using leaks, dictionaries, etc) like the password database 
built in this paper (referred to as CommonDB) and crackstation's password dictionary [25] (referred to as 
CrackstationDB). Additional information about the statistics is provided in the statistics section of this 
document. The scripts for calculating the crackability aspect for Google's password rating mechanism 
[23], passwordmeter.com [24] and CommonDB were implemented in python while the utilities for 
calculating crackability aspect for CrackstationDB were obtained from the crackstation-hashdb github 
repository [26] and modified to our requirements. Additional information about the statistics is provided 
in the statistics section of this document. 
3.3 Working 
The application working comprises of two processes: building the password database and the web 
application for serving user queries. 
3.3.1 Building the password database 
The first step in the process of building the database involves gathering password dictionaries and leak 
sources by the application maintainer. These sources are then inserted into the submission schema of the 
database that also stores user feedback and details of password leak or dictionary sources submitted by 
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application users. These sources (typically URLs) are then verified manually in order to avoid potential 
database poisoning by malicious users. 
The verification process involves identifying at least 3 media posts relevant to each URL. After 
verification, password files are downloaded from URLs obtained using harvester utility, user submission 
and manual research. The importer utility is leveraged to upload passwords into the database. A database 
schema is created for each new hash format. This way the database would have a collection of schemas 
like md5, shal, etc. Passwords are uploaded to the specific schemas based on their hash type. If a leak or 
a dictionary file has passwords in plaintext, they are converted to md5 hash and stored in md5 schema. 
This is to ensure that the application works with hashed version the password only to prevent any 
potential misuse. 
Building the Password Database 
INPUT DB INSERT VERIFY DOWNLOAD DB UPLOAD 
Manual 
Research Convert 
Verify valid plaintext 
I Insert Uf{Ls URLs passwords 
(Manual) gathered from into Hash 
1 Harvester different Output l Download (Source: --. sources into Password 
Harvester) the Hesearch & Files Submission Identify Upload 
Database Pasword passwords I Dictionary or into 
User Leall file password 
Submissi()(ls location ( If database 
(Source: not 
Web provided) 
Application) I 
Figure 1: Building the Password Database 
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The application database has been designed considering the performance and scalability aspect. If a 
password file has been identified with a hash format that does not have a corresponding schema yet, the 
importer utility will create a schema for that hash format and subsequently all the leaks or dictionaries 
that have passwords in this hash format will be uploaded to this schema as separate tables as opposed to 
maintaining a single table for storing all the hashes. This way, for a specific hash input the respective hash 
schema will be searched rather than searching the entire database. The same has been depicted using the 
following two figures. Figure 2: Current database represents the current database while Figure 3: Future 
Database refers to the database structure when different hash inputs are imported into the database. 
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3.3.2 Application Work.flow 
The workflow of this application is similar to a standard web application workflow for a search operation. 
Using our application, the user enters the password in a search bar and selects one of the two radio 
buttons that are used to determine if user input is in plaintext format or in hashed format. On submission 
of this search form, the PHP search script is fired on the server side that takes user's input and converts it 
into a hash if the input supplied is in plaintext format following which a search for that hash in the 
database is initiated. If the user input is already in hash format, the input hash is searched directly in the 
database without any hashing process. The application looks for user hash in specific database schema 
based on hash format (for eg. if the user input is a sha I hash, then the password is searched in sha 1 
schema only) while on the other side if the user input was in plaintext, user input is converted into each 
hash format supported by our application and searched in all hash schemas until the hash is found. The 
final step of this process is alerting the user if the password hash was found in our database or not and 
also informing them about the source (leak or dictionary name) in which the hash was found. The 
application doesn't store passwords inputted by user. 
,splay Rasul: 
to User 
Figure 4: Web Application Workflow 
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3.4 Application GUI & Usage 
Website: Home Page 
The home page of the web application presents a search bar for receiving user's password. Since, 
passwords are in plain text or hash format we present the user with two radio buttons to present the 
application with the type of input. In addition to the user input, the home page also focuses on providing 
users with some important information about the application with the intention of encouraging them to 
use this application. 
PasswordslnPublic 
Supponed Input: Current 
• C�ar text p.assword 
• J.105 
Supponed Input: Future 
• SHA1 
• SHA25€ 
Cl PasswordslnPuhlic 
PasswordS1nPubl1c 
Pla1n!ext Hash 
More Information 
• What IS a d1cbonary attack? 
• How does thts work.? 
• Isl safe to enter my pas.sword here? 
Are questions like these runmng in your mind? 
Cid on the button below and know more 
Figure 5: Website - Home Page 
Statistics Terms & Conoltions :.cntac 
Updates 
• Nov 2013 Added myspace password lea, 
• Nov 2013. Added roclyou password leal 
• Oct 2013 f.105 hashes supported 
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Website: About Page 
The about page of the website is a simple page provides general background information about the most 
common authenticating mechanism - passwords and the state of existing password strength estimation 
utilities. The page also describes the goals of this project. 
PasswordslnPublic 
FAQ Terms & Conditions Contact 
The Project 
Almost all ex1st1ng pass,..ord strength evaluators and online seMce pr<Mders (Gma1I, Yahoo mail, Paypal, Twitter etc) password strength estimators 
determine the effectr.eness of passwords chosen by user based on different entropy techniques or a s1m1lar function of the parameters length complexity 
and unpred1ctab1lrty These techniques often ignore passwords part of publicly available password d1ct1onanes and passwords leaked as a result of a 
secunty breach These publicly released passwords are often the first choice 1n password attacks for a malicious adversary and particularly scnp1-k1dd1es 
This website 1s an attempt to min1m1ze he use of such pass,..ords thereby reducing the impact of d1ct1onary attacks significantly 
Passwords are still the most common form of authenticating mechanism used to identify users and are likely to remain for a significant amount of time in 
the future because of the practicality and convenience aspects associated w,th them for the seMce providers and end-users respect,vely A preknown 11st of 
passwords are gathered together to form a pass,..ord d1ct1onary file D1ct1onary attacks leverage such pass .. ord dict1onanes and automate the attempt of 
breaking into password-protected appl1cat1ons and systems by trying each wordlpass,.ord listed in the pass,.ord d1ct1onary D1ct1onary based password 
cracking 1s easy to execute and almost every pass,..ord cracking tool 1s bundled with a pre-built d1ct1onary thereby a1d1ng scnpt-k1dd1es in performing 
d1ct1onary based password attacks 
The primary goal of this proiect 1s to build a database of unique passwords from language d1ct1onanes publicly available password d1ct1onanes and 
passwords leaked over the 1ntemet and allow regular users and administrators to venfy 1f the,r chosen passwords are suscep11ble to d1ct1onary attacks that 
use publicly released passwords 
Figure 6: Website - About Page 
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Website: Statistics Page 
The statistics page of the website provides various statistics associated with the observations of this 
project. The statistics page presents the imported passwords statistics and the crackability statistics. The 
imported passwords statistics list the source type (password leak or password dictionary) of an import and 
the number of passwords imported using each file. 
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Figure 7: Website - Statistics Page 
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Website: FAQ Page 
The FAQ button on the first page and the FAQ tab present the below shown Frequently Asked Questions. 
This page outlines basic information related to dictionary attack and additional information about the way 
the application is built which includes handling user's password, password database updates and statistics. 
The idea of the FAQ page is to provide transparency about the web application functioning and encourage 
user's to try this application. 
PasswordslnPublic 
Frequently Asked Questions 
�c tout ,on, Contact 
Here are some common questions and answers that should clear up your queries )·ou can contact us for any other questions that ha'o'en1 been ensv;ered here 
What is a dictionary attack'? 
A pre-known 11st of passwords ere gathered together to form a password ddionary file. OIC'tlClnary attacks leverage sud! pass\•.1ord d1Cf:10nanes and automate the 
attempt of breal..ing rite password-protected applications and systems by tryflg each word/password bted it the password dictionary Dd:Jonary based password 
crack119 IS easy to execute and almost e,ery password cract.:119 tool as bundled wlh a pre-buil dld10nnry thereby aldtng scnpt-k.ldd1es m perfomung ddNJnary based 
password attacu Attad:ers buict conl)rehensr,e password d1cbonanes by CO"l)1hng passwords from vanous d1chonanes and password leaks 
Why should I trust you? 
';his site was estabkshed towards a securty research proJed that ts aimed at ald1119 users in seled111g passwords by pre<went1119 them from us119 passwords that 
are already available n, the publlC (internet). You can read more about thts proJed in our abeut secbon If you are interested to Ulow more about the proJed. p�ase 
c:ntllc' as wl:h any questions or concerns 
How do you handle our passwords'? 
The web applicabon accepts two forms of 11put Plau, text and Hash -Oe web applicatllln doesn1 log any input entered on the query page Are you stia suspicious? In 
case you are we accept hash also That way you don1 have to enter your password 111 plan text 
What is a hash and why is it better than clear text'? 
Hashing IS the one way transformation of a string of characters mto a usualy shorter f1Xed-length vakJe or 1,.,ey that represents the origrial str119 The flXed length 
value (end resul} of hashing process JS caled as a hash The 'one way"' means that ts nearly rnpossib� to derrve the or191 al text from the hash 
What should you do if your password is found in our database'? 
If your password was found 11 our database. 1f you h1h1e already use that passwords mmediatety change password for al your accounts and verity that there are 
no discrep1rncees or unauthonzed changes in those accounts Avoid using passwords found ri our datab8Se for any of your accounts 
Where do you get the data and Is the database updated regularly'? 
... he applicat10n components invo�te a harvesting infrastrudure that gathers new data e't·eryday. In add1tl0n to the automatic harvest1r1g infrastructure, manual 
research and gathering of password dd10nanes and leals are also conducted. The web appic8tion 8tso 8Uows securty researchers to subml leal,., or dlClJonary 
1nformabon.The gathered data IS then analyzed and imported r1to our passwor::f database dally 
Are there any statistics that you have gathered and compared'? 
P�ase refer to our c page for stats gathered for this proJed 
Figure 8: Website - FAQ Page 
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Website: Terms & Conditions (Generic) 
The Terms & Conditions page lays down standard agreement for a online web application. 
PasswordslnPublic 
� .<,!,o. S1Et: 
PasswordslnPublic Terms and Conditions ("Agreement") 
P·,:s Aree.,....e:"t -,,·as ..a:st rro: !.!!': o" Se.pt:.n-� .. 3 ..:. 2·::;?. 
F.!e.3..5-E' ..-e� t+-i!s.€ T�'TI".i. a.".:l Co".,ltor.!: {"Agre,e_rrc:-::t'. leT'!Ts a. .. o Coi:::f to.-.:j oare.! .. 1ry �'"ore �.s,r-;; tttp:/h,.,."K,Fa.ss·NOr1slr?.;bltr::.oo� ftt-e- S·te·; ·:Jop:.•at�: 
oy ?3..:s· .  'Ordslr P1;_b,1c fi...s", ... .,t", Of ''o;.fl. Tt-,s. A;re.rr.-ert sets fortr tre fe.-1;.fy t,1ri,r; t�'!!';> 3.,i,d ::or1 tors for yo .. r -...se o� tre Ste at 
.,ttp:1/il,-.·.1;. Pa.ss4''.l"a..il rP ;;.t-�c.:>:>I"':. 
By a�sT:, or u..S..r; t'"-e Ste �r. a.ry �a r r.er, �,o;::::.' .. ·:l l'.'J, c."'t '"¢1 Irr. tei: to, v; s.tr-; Of b•:r•·s;s::1 t'"e S:te .or ::ortrib .. Li:::, :::orte."t or otre.r rr.ate.·r3.:s to tre S.te, 
yot.- a;rH to be bo;..r.: by tt-e.:= Tem:s ar·: Cor:1ti0,.s. Ca.p;ta.�e:1 t:Jo:"t5 a.re Oi:�Jre-: 111':' tt s i'-drtt"!'e:rt 
lnt..llo,ctu.l Property 
T!:e s ti: ... : ts. 0*"'1 _:;.I ::Ol"ti:".t ,  fut .. rc ,i/•·= f:.r:::t,01:a.�ty 3.'"i: Oilt'f:i::l by Fa.ss ·M::.td.slr_P.:b�:: a."'C •re prjte-::tel by lr.t:''"!",i.lO\':"a.l oocyr:-;;rt. tr.i,:i:r-r.,r<., patr.,:t, 
traa,e ::-cre.t ar.J ct+-":.r l!:tE. :::;;t...a. pr.o�'ty or propr,ets.ry !•;tt: .3.i�rlS 
Tenninat1on 
'!Ne !"'!'3.Y tE.'"!'!".:r..i.te yo;;r a:::::ess to lr.'e S·te. wtf'o:..t �;..= :,r !'.:.t::e, '1.1°'_,::;;!"_ rray .re.s;,;'rt 1,r t".'e for!e. t..:re arl a.est�::::tc.:.. o' a� �for r.itor. a.!:.S.::>cat� ,. tt. yo .. 
A.� prO'e'!.5�Jrs of tr"!: �ree.�t".t tt;.t b)' l;,eir !'.3.t.;re sto;,.--\.:: s.orv;-.•e- t:r!T'..;".'al,or. :':.!.� 5�r'e'1Ve te-rf!' _ratio;., .i!'.:::�,::..!'.•; 
·1rrarty d,.s.c.a.T!T'eJ:. �r-::.en-.!"Jty, ar:i Lrr,ta.t.oo:: o� f.acity. 
Links To Other Sit..s 
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Changes To This Agrttrnent 
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Figure 9: Website - Terms & Conditions 
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Website: Contact Page 
The contact page is an import aspect of this application. The contact page is used for two important 
things: receiving password submissions and receiving feedback. The password database is a collection of 
password leaks harvested over the internet and the commonly used dictionaries. 
PasswordslnPublic 
i-,orr.,� �Li� '.:tat:5?1C!i FA::- ,..ern-s ! 2 
Submissions 
Submit Password Leaks Submit Password Dictionaries 
Feedback 
S: ::.t fee:::.:a�· tyt·:< 
Figure to: Website - Contact Page 
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Usage: Plain text based password query 
The following screenshots demonstrate the query for a plain text password input and the result based on 
the password's presence in the password database built from leaks and dictionaries. 
PasswordslnPublic 
Supported Input: Current 
• Clear text pusword 
• MD5 
Supported Input: Future 
• SHA! 
• SHA256 
P•sswordslnPubltc 
password@123 
• Pfarriut Hash 
More Information 
• V'.'hll 11 a d1cbonMy attack? 
• How does th,1 '#Ofk? 
• Is 11. safe to enttf my password ti•"'
Are q.,est,ons �k• L!'leu runr11ng 11'1 you, 
m1'Cf? Cbck on the button bc!IOw and kFIOW 
mon1III 
Updates 
• NOit 2013 Added mysp.::e pan-word leak 
• NOil 201J Added nx:kyou passllfOfd le• 
• Oct 2013 MOS hashH supported 
Figure 11: Usage - Input Plaintext Password 
PasswordslnPublic 
PasswordslnPubl1c 
Password hash already in public! 
2138cb6b0302eM382dd9b36n576b24 was found in rockyou password leak. 
Supported Input: Current 
• Clear text password 
• MD!> 
Supported Input: Future 
• SHA1 
• SHA256 
C PasswordslnPubhc 
More Information 
• What ,s a dlct,onaiy attack? 
• Ho¥, does th,s wortc? 
• ,s rt safe to enter my pa&aword he111? 
Ale qu1tiit1ons �ke these runnrng m your 
mmd' Ckk on the button belov. and know 
"""'" 
Updates 
• Nov 2013 Added myspace �ssword leak 
• Nov 201J Added roclcyou password leak 
• Od 2013 MD!, hashH supportad 
Figure 12: Usage - Output Password Presence 
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f 
Usage: Hash based Query 
The following screenshots demonstrate the query for a hashed password input when the password is 
found in the password database built from leaks and dictionaries. 
PasswordslnPubllc 
Supported Input: Current 
• Clear text passwo1d 
• MD5 
Supported Input: Future 
• SHA1 
, SHA256 
0 PassoNordslnP1Jbl,c 
PasswordslnPublic 
- About 
' 
PasswordstnPubl1c 
21 38c b5b0302e84 382dd9b36775 76b24 
Pl.-iteXI o Hash 
More Information 
• What 1s a d1ehooary attack? 
• How does this WOf'K? 
• Is 11 safe to enter my password here? 
Ive questions like these running tn your 
mi,,d? CNck on the button belD'* and kn0¥11 
morellt 
Updates 
• NCH 2013 Added myspace password leak 
• NO¥ 2013 Added rockyou password leak 
• Oct 2013 MOS hashes supported 
Figure 13: Usage - Input Password Hash 
' 
ttome About 
Passwords1nPubl1c 
Password hash already in public! 
2138cb5b0302e84382dd9b3677576b24 was found in rockyou password leak. 
Supported Input: Current 
• Clear text password 
• MOS 
Supported Input: Future 
• SHA1 
, SHA256 
C Passw0<dslnPublic 
More Information 
• WI lilt 1s a d1Ct1oriary attack? 
• How does this wort,:? 
• Is It safe to enter my password here? 
Ase questions like these running in your 
mind? Chck on the button below and know 
moreut 
Updates 
• ND'l 2013 Added myspace password lea!( 
• Nov 2013 Added rockyou password 1eak 
• Oct 2013 M05 hashes supported 
Figure 14: Usage - Output Password Presence 
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Usage: Password not found in database 
The following screenshots demonstrate the query for a plain text password input when the password is not 
found in the password database built from leaks and dictionaries. 
PasswordslnPublic 
Support•d Input: Current 
• Cleartexts,assword 
• U05 
Supponed Input: Future 
• SHA1 
• SltA256 
PasswordslnPublic 
PasswordslnPubUc 
saS01JQf:::1..ZJcft 
�·Pll!lr1text Huh 
More Information 
• Vv'tlat•1dlctJc,r\ary1ttaO."' 
• Howdonth•wor1..' 
• Is I sale to enter mv password here' 
Are QUoffbona lile U'IKe nmn11g " your nwtC" 
Clci. on the butte" below and MOv. more 
Updates 
• Ptov 2C13 Added myspac:e password 1HI 
• Nav 201� Acicted roctyou password IHI 
• Oct 2013 I.ID!' hashes aupporte(! 
Figure 15: Usage - Input Password 
PasswordSlnPublic 
You password was notfound 1n our database! 
We are constantly updating our database, please check back later! 
Supponed Input: Current 
• Clear text password 
• UD5 
Supported Input: Future 
• SHA1 
• SHA.256 
More Information 
• 'Ntl1t•adlc:klnaryattacl." 
• How does this wort' 
• Is I sate lo enter m, password hffe'? 
Are QUesllons Ile these runnng l'I )'(lur fTWl(f? 
CIICI. en tile button below and t..now mor, 
Updates 
• Nov 2013 Added mvspace password leal 
• NC' 2013 Added roclyotJ paSSWOfd teal 
• Od 2ce � hashes SYpported 
Figure 16: Usage - Output When Password Not Found 
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3.5 Application Deployment Models 
The application can be deployed using different models as outlined below: 
3.5.1 Cloud Instance 
With the convenience and advantages of cloud based implementations, an Amazon Machine Image (AMI) 
on Amazon Web Services (A WS) or other such pre-configured images on different cloud platforms would 
provide great flexibility. This would allow a regular user as well as organizations to launch the pre­
configured passwords-in-public cloud instance for personal and organizational use respectively. 
3.5.2 Virtual Machine 
Virtual Appliance is another deployment model that can be considered for organizations. The application 
can be packaged and installed on a virtual machine so that it can be easily setup in the organization's 
private data center or in house deployment. Organization's concerned about transmitting password over 
the network outside their organization can consider the virtual appliance deployment model. Different 
virtual appliances can be built to support variety of virtualization platforms like VMware, KYM, etc. 
3.5.3 API Model 
The application can also be provided as a service using public or private API for querying user or 
employee passwords and identifying the presence of their chosen password in the password database. The 
AP! can accept password as the input and return information associated with that password like presence 
in the password database, number of leaks that have this password, etc. 
3.5.4 Database Only Model 
The last model described in this section is the database only model where users or organizations would be 
allowed to download the password database only. This model will not be a pre-configured application and 
the user or organization opting this deployment model must build an command line or web based utility to 
interact with the application. 
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The deployment models cloud instance, virtual appliance and database only can be bundled with an 
update script that would allow users to update their database periodically. Additionally, these models can 
also be leveraged to build a scalable implementation. The cloud instance deployment model would allow 
organizations to spin multiple instances to cater to the needs of a large user base. Similarly, they can 
deploy multiple virtual appliances to on their virtualization platform when option for virtual appliance 
deployment model while the database only deployment model would allow the users to clone or replicate 
the password database to serve large user requests. 
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4 STATISTICS 
The proof of concept for this paper is based on our database that included a sample of passwords 
(CommonDB column) harvested and gathered from easily available password leak files and commonly 
used dictionaries. The commonly used dictionaries considered for this test included john-the-ripper (27], 
cain (28], twitter's banned passwords and 500 worst passwords (29]. To demonstrate the potential of the 
concept presented in this paper, we also considered Crackstation dictionary (25] which is a popular 
password dictionary that has "1212356398" passwords gathered from various sources. 
Table I presents the statistics that compare how an online service provider (Google), an online password 
strength estimating utility (passwordmeter.com) and password databases built for this paper (CommonDB 
and CrackstationDB) fared when tested using password leak files listed in Leak Name column. Actual 
password leaks contain real passwords of people and were hence considered as a basis for the 
comparison. 
For the comparison, the number of passwords from password leak files identified as weak were noted for 
Google's password rating mechanism and for PasswordMeter's password rating website while on the other 
hand the number of passwords from leak files found in Common DB and CrackstationDB were noted. 
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Table 1: Password Strength Comparison 
Leak Name Total Google SimpleDB Password CrackstationDB 
Passwords Meter 
Alypaa 1384 35.48 71.37 98.99 100 
Carders 1904 26.79 68.54 80.73 93.22 
Elite Haecker 895 45.81 88.16 98.99 100 
Facebook 
(Pastebay Malware) 55 20 49.09 87.27 100 
Facebook (Phished) 2442 13.96 100 76.6 99.84 
Faith writers 8347 19.98 59.6 26.67 100 
HakS 2351 9.23 24.97 60.95 100 
MySpace 37144 8.06 49.92 76.82 99.97 
PhpBB 184389 7.35 40.29 79.49 100 
Porn Unknown Site 8088 30.46 75.64 95.57 100 
Singles.org 12233 22.11 100 91 100 
Ultimate Strip Club 38820 14.34 51.65 81.84 100 
Rockyou 12413667 0.37 1.95 72.91 99.97 
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- --------------- . 
The statistics demonstrated that the percentage of passwords identified as weak by Google's password 
rating mechanism (Google) was significantly lower than the percentage of passwords that are part of other 
leak files and common dictionaries (CommonDB). On the other hand, the password rating mechanism at 
passwordmeter.com (PasswordMeter) fared significantly better than Google and CommonDB. The 
concept of password database was expanded from CommonDB to CrackstationDB to better demonstrate 
the potential of the application. The statistics for CrackstationDB presented an average of 99.4% success 
rate in terms of finding a password in the Crackstation dictionary thereby demonstrating the best 
performance. 
These statistics justify that existing password strength evaluating applications and online service's 
password strength estimator primarily focus on parameters like entropy, length and/or complexity and do 
not consider dictionary attacks while evaluating user passwords, thereby providing incomprehensive 
password strength estimation. 
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5 FUTURE WORK 
The existing implementation does not incorporate other password strength determination parameters for 
determining the strength level of the password selected by the user. Future work could be integrating 
demonstrated approach that focuses on dictionary-based attacks with existing password strength 
evaluators that primarily focus on entropy, complexity and randomness. Integrating the demonstrated 
technique into password settings of applications, password setup routines of operating systems, online 
web services and password strength indicators can also be considered as an avenue of future work. The 
technique discussed in this paper can also be integrated with password managers (LastPass, Browser 
password managers, etc) to alert users when the passwords selected by them are found in the database. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The area of implementing authentication mechanisms, improving password based authentication 
mechanisms and assisting users in selecting secure passwords is under constant research. In addition to 
the improvement in password based authentication systems, password attack defense techniques and 
password strength evaluators, security researchers and evangelists must make efforts to continually 
educate and guide users about alternate authentication mechanisms, selection of passwords and the 
various password based attack techniques. The technique demonstrated in this paper incorporates the 
concept of guiding and enabling the users to select relatively secure passwords from a dictionary attack 
perspective by informing them about passwords that are part of publicly released password dictionaries 
and leaks. Integrating such a technique with existing password rating mechanisms would result in a 
thorough and comprehensive password strength estimation. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Appendix: Scripts 
8.1.1 Password Importer 
,1,,, n111 , 111 / 11110,1 
l 1-
from _future_ import division 
from warnings import filterwarnings 
import MySQLdb 
import hashlib 
import sys 
import argparse 
import ConfigParser 
import os 
import pdb 
filterwarnings('ignore', category=MySQLdb. Warning) 
f ,,,,, or,h 1111 ,he p,1,,11 � /J,1/ <it,, 
,·. I 
def crackability _db(infile, dbcreds): 
ef = open('/\ ar/\, W\\ /bootstrap/statistics, entries.csv', 'a') 
leakname = inti le.split(". ")[O] 
hashtype = infile.split(".")[1] 
datevalue = int(infi le.spl it("_")[2].spl it(". ")[O]) 
if hashtype == 'plaintext': 
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hashtype = 'md5' 
lh, """·. 11,H,. Lh,11,0, 1h, t.t, lci11v ll'L'. , , ,, frotll ,., .. ,, 
db = MySQLdb.connect(dbcreds[O], dbcreds[l ], dbcreds[2]) 
cur = db.cursor() 
try: 
,.,/i q Pl ,;7, / a,·,1 ,,rj, /1e/011).; I
db.select_ db(hashtype) 
u 
query = "SELECT table_name FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.T ABLES WHERE 
T ABLE_SCHEMA = 'o/os"' % hashtype 
cur.execute( query) 
tables = [] 
for table in cur.fetchall(): 
if leakname in table[O]: 
continue 
tables.append(table[(]) 
crackcount, hashcount = 0, r, 
with open(infile, 'r') as cf: 
for hash in cf: 
l\ 
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hash = hash.rstrip() 
hashcount += I 
for table in tables: 
If //1/t/,Jf)fl \J>flf• I 
query = "SELECT hashvalue FROM o/os WHERE hashvalue = 'o/os' LIMIT I"%
(table, hash) 
res _rows = int( cur.execute( query)) 
if res rows == I : 
print query 
crackcount += I 
break 
elif res rows == ): 
continue 
print "=========================================="
print "Final:", crackcount, hashcount 
crackability = (crackcount / hashcount) * I ')() 
print crackability 
print leakname + ": "+ str(crackability) 
entry = leakname + "." + \ 
str(crackcount) + "_" + str(hashcount) + "." + str(crackability) + "' n" 
ef. write( entry) 
print "Completed" 
print "----------------========------------------"
except: 
print "Error!" 
def im port_passwords( dbcreds, infilename ): 
I 
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/.,.,/7/J/h 
if infi lename.spl it(".")[ 1] == 'plainte-.t': 
hashtype = 'md5' 
else: 
hash type = infi lename.spl it(".")[ I] 
pass 
tablename = infilename.spl it(". ")[O] 
infi le path = str( os.getcwd())+"/"+infi lename 
JW/111 ll(J\'ht.l'f' 
db = MySQLdb.connect( dbcreds[(], dbcreds[ I], dbcreds[2]) 
/';. i)l1J1" LI '/,I\ 1/ 
cursor = db.cursor() 
try: 
sql_cd = "CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXIST5 °1os" %hashtype 
print "\n [+] import:",sql_cd 
db.select db(hashtype) 
sql_ct = "CREATE TABLE °'os (hashvalue VARBINARY(60) NOT NULL. UNIQUE 
(hashvalue))" %(tablename) 
print "\n[+] import:",sql_ct 
/()1{)/>17 
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sql_ld = "LOAD DATA IN FILE '%s' INTO TABLE %s FIELDS TERMINATED BY'' LINES 
TERMINATED BY '\n"' %(infilepath,tablename) 
print "\n[+] import:",sql_ld 
I \ 
cursor.execute(sq 1_ cd) 
cursor.execute(sq I_ ct) 
cursor.execute(sql_ld) 
db.commit() 
except MySQLdb.Error, e: 
/( 
if db: 
db.rollback() 
print "Error: %d: %s" %s( e.args[ J], e.args[ I]) 
sys.exit( ) 
finally: 
db.close() 
def build _infile(pwdfi le, detai Is): 
infilename = "%s_ %s_%s.%s.temp" %(details[ ],detai ls[O],details[,].replace('-',"),details[--1]) 
try: 
inf= open(infilename,'v\ ') 
with open(pwdfile, 'r') as pf: 
36 
for each in pf: 
print each 
except: 
pf.close() 
inf.close() 
finally: 
'II' /l'u'f/1,tr II 
each= each.rstrip() 
if details[-+]== 'plaintext': 
if each.strip(): 
else: 
else: 
hash_value = hashlib.mdS(each).hexdigest() 
print each, hash_ value 
continue 
hash value = each 
inf.write(hash_ value) 
inf.write("\n") 
pf.close() 
inf.close() 
return infilename 
def main(): 
37 
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='lmport pass\rnrd dictionaries or leaks into the 
pass\\ ord database') 
parser.add_argument('-d', '--diet', help='paSS\\Ord dictionary filename (absolute path if not in current 
director))') 
parser.add_argument('-1', '--leak', help='paSS\\Ord leak filename (absolute path if not in current 
director))') 
parser.add_argument('-f, '--format', help='Pass\,ord format in the dictionary\nValid options: 
plaintext I md5 I sha I etc') 
parser.add_ argument('-date', '--date', help=' date of pasS\\ ord leak') 
parser.add_argument('-url', '--url', help='URL for dictionar) I leak source I media post about leak if 
no leak source') 
parser.add_argument('-s', '--stats', help='Perfonn statistics calculation onl:, I No infile generation I No 
upload I Existing infile must be provided') 
parser.add_argument('-b', '--build', help='Use this for building infile') 
args = ,ars(parser.parse_args()) 
print args, len(args) 
if args['stats']: 
/-. l ,l1f1{71J14,,,: ·'1 /J \/ 
config = ConfigParser.ConfigParser() 
config.read("conf/importer.conf') 
host = config.get('dbaccess','dbhost') 
user = config.get('dbaccess','dbuser') 
pwd = config.get('dbaccess' ,'dbpass') 
dbcreds = [host, user, pwd] 
infile = args['stats'] 
crackability _db(infile, dbcreds) 
elif len(args) != 7: 
38 
else: 
print "Arguments Error" 
nu,·,•1 ,rel till 1;,,11,1,·1• t,h 
try: 
if args ['di ct']: 
pwdfile = args['dict'] 
type = 'diet' 
elif args [' I eak. ']: 
else: 
pwdfile = args['leak.'] 
t) pe = 'leak'
raise Exception(" Arguments Error") 
sys.exit() 
h JJ I I,·/ 
config = ConfigParser.ConfigParser() 
confi g. read(" conf/i 111 porter .conf') 
host = config.get('dbaccess','dbhost') 
user = config.get('dbaccess','dbuser') 
pwd = config.get('dbaccess','dbpass') 
dbcreds = [host, user, pwd] 
date = args['date'] 
source_ name= args[t) pe ].split("/")[- I ].split(".")[( ] 
source_type = t) pe 
source_url = args['url'] 
hash_type = args['format'] 
details = [source_ name,source _ type,source_url,date,hash_type] 
39 
,I I to ,IL I\ Tiff 
intilename = build_intile(pwdtile, details) 
t c1tl fr,r ,11\t rt ,/L,,L, 111/0 
import _passwords( dbcreds,inti lename) 
I ·1,f ,IL ,n,t m n 
crackability _db(intilename, dbcreds) 
except IOError: 
print "File doesn't exist or incorrect tile path" 
except: 
print "Error!!!" 
if name == ' ma111 
main() 
40 
8.1.2 Google Password Rating URL - Stats Generator 
·'' '11111,,1/z,l/i 
import requests 
import sys 
import urllib 
import subprocess 
import time 
from collections import defaultdict 
def stats(): 
#labels 
WEAK = I 
MEDIUM =2 
STRONG = 3 
VER YSTRONG = 4 
file name = sys.argv[ I] 
pf= open(filename, 'r') 
count= defau!tdict(int) 
for p\\-d in pf.readlines(): 
url = 'http://\\\\\\.goog!e.com accounts/Rate Pass\\ ord?Passwd=' \ 
+ url ! i b.q uote _pl us(pwd.rstri p())
try: 
print pwd, url 
r = requests.get(ur!) 
if r.status code == I 0-l: 
r = temp_sleep(url) 
41 
elif r.status code == 2UO: 
res = r.text.rstrip() 
if res == ' I ': 
count['Wcount'] += I 
elif res == '2': 
count['Mcount'] += I 
elif res == '3': 
count['Scount'] += I 
elif res == '4': 
count['YScount'] += I 
else: 
count['unkno\\ n'] += 
else: 
print "HTTP status code is %s" % r.status_code 
print r.text 
count['not I 04not200'] += 
except Exception, e: 
print repr(e) 
time.sleep(10) 
print count 
def tern p _sleep( url): 
print"[+] Sleeping for 5 mins" 
ti me.sleep(., 00) 
r = requests.get(url) 
if r.status code == 0-l: 
temp_sleep(url) 
42 
elif r.status code == 200: 
return r 
def main(): 
stats() 
if name 
main() 
main '· 
43 
8.1.3 PasswordMeter.com - Stats Generator 
fi 
import sys 
from pyvirtualdisplay import Display 
from splinter import Browser 
#labels 
WEAK= I 
MEDIUM = 2 
STRONG = 3 
VERYSTRONG = 4 
def stats(): 
display = Display(visible=O, size=(&Oll, 6ilU)) 
display.start() 
ti lename = sys.argv[ I] 
pf = open(filename,'r') 
count = {'VWcount':O, 'Wcount':0, 'Gcount':0, 'Scount':0, 'VScount':O, 'Unicode':O} 
browser = Browser('firefox') 
fi leurl = "file:/ /path/to/pass\\ ordmeter.htm I" 
browser. visit(fi leurl) 
for p'wd in pf.readlines(): 
pwd = pwd.rstrip() 
44 
if not pwd: 
continue 
pwdtype = is_ascii(pwd) 
if pwdtype: 
browser.ti I l('pasS\\ ordP\, d',pwd) 
result= browser.find_by_id('complexity').value 
if result == 'Ver) Weak': 
count['VWcount'] += 
elif result== 'Weak': 
count['Wcount'] += I 
elifresult == 'Good': 
count['Gcount'] += J 
elif result== 'Strong': 
count['Scount'] += 
elif result== 'Strong': 
count['VScount'] += 
print pwd+" : "+ result 
print count 
else: 
count['U nicode']+= 
print count 
browser.quit() 
display.stop() 
45 
print "--------------Fina 1------------------------"
print count 
def is_ascii(pwd): 
return all(ord(c) < 128 for c in pwd) 
def main(): 
stats() 
if name ==' main 
main() 
46 
8.1.4 Password Database - Stats Generator (CommonDB) 
/1\I {'/Ii ('/11 f'\ //if,// 
'1(///l < t1/f-"i - -
from _future_ import division 
from warnings import filterwarnings 
import ConfigParser 
import argparse 
import hashlib 
import os 
import sys 
import MySQLdb 
,11 I II 
filterwarnings('ignore', category=MySQLdb. Warning) 
def crackability _db(infile, dbcreds): 
ef = open('/var/wwv\ /bootstraplstatistics/entries.csv', 'a') 
fif = open('foundinfile.txt', 'a') 
leaknarne = infile.split(".")[C] 
hashtype = infile.split(".")[1] 
datevalue = int(infi le.spl it("_")[2].spl it(". ")[O]) 
if hashtype == 'plaintext': 
hashtype = 'md5' 
47 
,I l1J11)f /11,11 'hdJl'..1'/ f/1.) f/t J..·11)(.r ll\'1,, (/ tr,,111 1,u,I 
db = MySQLdb.connect(dbcreds[O], dbcreds[l], dbcreds[2]) 
( ·,., 111n1, J, ,,r"J, of,,e,._ I 
cur = db.cursor() 
try: 
\(: c.f,Jf, J 1,1r ,I, ,, f1J t fl1t /Ju,,·1 ,,rel,/-, 11,11, f 
db.select_ db(hashtype) 
(\'/ll ,11 lilt 
11,,, ,_1·.1111t 
query = "SELECT table_name FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.T ABLES WHERE 
TABLE_SCHEMA = 'o/os"' % hashtype 
cur.execute( query) 
tables = [] 
for table in cur.fetchall(): 
print leakname, table[ '] 
if table[O] in leakname: 
print "table in leak.name" 
continue 
tab I es.append( tab I e [ 0]) 
print tables 
crackcount, hashcount = 0, 0 
with open(infile, 'r') as cf: 
for hash in cf: 
( •(If 
( ( 
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hash= hash.rstrip() 
hashcount += I 
for table in tables: 
If 1111(1.Jh/c \f1///t "i(}j, Jc1h \ elf/I, 
query= "SELECT hashvalue FROM o/os WHERE hashvalue = 'o/os' LIMIT I"% ( 
table, hash) 
res_rows = int(cur.execute(query)) 
if res rows == I : 
print query 
crackcount += I 
break 
elif res rows == 0: 
continue 
print "=========================================="
print "Final:", crackcount, hashcount 
crackability = (crackcount / hashcount) * 00 
print crackabi I ity 
print leak name + ": " + str( crackabi I ity) 
entry = leakname + "." + \ 
str(crackcount) + "." + str(hashcount) + \ 
"." + str(crackability) + "\n" 
ef. write( entry) 
print "Completed" 
print ''===============---------=================="
except: 
print "Error!" 
def main(): 
49 
,11 .1!11111, 11/\ ,,,,,,,,, 
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( 
description='Import pass\rnrd dictionaries or leaks into the paSS\\Ord database') 
parser.add_ argument( 
'-d', '--diet', help='pasrnord dictionar) filename (absolute path if not in current director))') 
args = \ ars(parser.parse _ args()) 
infilename = args['dict'] 
11t!.l111! . JI, 
config = ConfigParser.ConfigParser() 
config.read("conf/importer.conf') 
host = config.get('dbaccess', 'dbhost') 
user = config.get('dbaccess', 'dbuser') 
pwd = config.get('dbaccess', 'dbpass') 
dbcreds = [host, user, pwd] 
crackabil ity _db(infi lename, dbcreds) 
if name 
main() 
main 
50 
8.1.S Crackstation Dictionary - Stats Generator (CrackstationDB) 
?php 
xdebug_ disable(); 
error _reporti ng(O); 
require_once('LookupTable.php'); 
$file=fopen($argv[J ], "r"); 
$stats_file = "stats.txt"; 
$md5 = new LookupTable("crackstation-mdS.idx", "crackstation.txt", "md5"); 
$total = O; 
$count = O; 
while(!feotr$file )) 
{ 
} 
$each pwd = fgets($file ); 
Seach_pw d = trim ($each_p\\ d); 
$total = $total + I; 
Sto_crack = md5($each_pwd); 
$result= $md5->crack($to _ crack); 
if ($result !== FALSE) { 
$count = $count + I ; 
echo "Cracked: ". $result[ ] . " Count:". $count." Total:". $total. "\n"; 
fclose($file); 
$crack _percentage = ($count/$total) * I OfJ; 
$crack_percentage = round($crack_percentage, 2); 
$result_final = 
''======-==============================Final============================ 
Password File: $argv[1] 
Total Cracked Count: $count 
Total pasS\\Ords in $argv[l]: $total 
Percentage Cracked: $crack_percentage 
"·' 
print $result_final; 
file put contents($stats_file, $result_final, FJLE_APPEND I LOCK_EX); 
,, ... > 
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8.1.6 Harvester for Datalossdb 
It \f /· i11. II' J 1 ,/,, 1/1 
L, 1 li11l' ltl/ 
from _future_ import division 
from datetime import datetime 
from math import ceil 
from mechanize import Browser 
import bs4 
import re 
fl'jl('I 1 (. Jf)/(1 ._ 
ll/1J 1/1//>/-' I 
urls = {'dbloss': 
'http://datalossdb.org/search?data _ t) pe%5 8%5 D=P'A D&d i rection=asc&order=reported _date'} 
target_file = open('datalossdb_urls.list', 'a+') 
111t11,::e ,,, ,n 
b = Browser() 
b.set_handle_robots( \�)
b.addheaders = [('User-agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (X 11: U: \
Linux i686: en-US: rv: 1.9.0. I)\ 
Gecko/2008071615 Fedora/3.0. I- I .fc9 Firefox/3.0. I')] 
•A I ti/I 
1,1 
b.open(' https ://data I ossd b.org/sess ions/new')
52 
b.select_form(nr=O)
b['login'] = 'tarunmadiraju' 
b['paSS\\Ord'] = \\c*Y9 I phR5j31MeZ/\8mv' 
b.submit()
L /r1, , /i/111/ 1 t Ir i, \'• I /i,.�/ n,1 
response = b.open(urls['dbloss']) 
soup = bs4.Beautifu1Soup(response.read()) 
lie /t/(',//1 f1 ()/1/ fill I 
def get_first(total_incidents): 
print "get_first", total_incidents 
pages = int(ceil(total_incidents I 20)) 
print pages 
ra\\_input("Continue 5?") 
n 't cJ ,t t/u 1'11 [J 
for page in ,range( I, pages + I): 
page_url = 11 { pwd_base_url l &page= 1 page]\ 
I] 
". format(pwd _ base _url=urls['dbloss'], page=page) 
page _response = b.open(page _ url) 
soup_in = bs4.Beautifu1Soup(page_response.read()) 
RI\ I , th, fll///'i'/ f 
for each in soup_in.find_all('a'): 
if "/incidents/" in each['href]: 
target_file. write("http://datalossdb.org/ ( incident_ url J" 
. format(i ncident_ url=each['href])) 
target_fi le. write("\n") 
53 
/ii/ill/ 
print" Harvesting Summary = : date) : : incidents)" \ 
.format(date=datetime.now().strftime('% Y%m%d'), incidents=new _count) 
target_file. write(" Entr) = l date} : : incidents)" 
. format( date=datetime.now().strftime('% Y%m%d'), 
incidents=total_incidents)) 
target_fi I e. write("\n\n") 
target_ftle.close() 
def get_ new(ne� _ count, old_ count): 
pages_from = int(ceil(old_count / 2 )) 
pages_to = int(ceil(new_count / 20)) 
(,ti!.!,, ,,,1111'1' f) 
for page in \.range(pages_from, pages_to + ): 
page_url = " ( p\, d_base_url l &page= : page]\ 
".format(pwd _base_ url=urls['dbloss'], page=page) 
page _response = b.open(page _ url) 
soup _in = bs4. Beauti fu I Soup(page _response.read()) 
l iht I RL 
for each in soup_in.find_all('a'): 
if" incidents/" in each['href]: 
target_fi le. write("http://datalossdb.org/ { incident_ url l" 
. format(i ncident_ url=each ['href])) 
target_ft le. write("\n ") 
54 
target_fi le. write("\n") 
lr,/)( /Id /),JJ', C \///),!, \[///7/1/,// \ 
print "Harvesting Summar) = ( date l : ( incidents J" \ 
. format( date=datetime.now().strftime('o/o Y%m%d'), incidents=new _ count) 
target_file.write("Entry = (dateJ : {incidents}" 
.format( date=datetime.now().strftime('o/o Yo/omo/od'), 
incidents=new _ count)) 
target_ ti le. write("\n\n ") 
target_ fi I e.c I ose() 
def main(): 
I ,1,J/ /1////1 rd ()/ 7/1 
for each_span_tag in soup.tindAll('span'): 
if "Displa) ing Incident" in each_span_tag.text: 
current_incident_count = int( 
each _span _tag.tindChi ldren('b')[ I ].text) 
It ,,, ( /1"/( \ u 
target_tile.seek(O, 0) 
file_data = target_tile.read() 
entries = re.findall(r'Entr) = .*', tile_data) 
print"[+] Incidents harvested previous!) : (entries) ".format(entries=entries) 
11 
if entries: 
old_incident_count = int(entries[-1 ].split(":")[ ]) 
diff = current incident count - old incident count 
if diff: 
- - - -
55 
print"(+] Nev. incidents added. Difference:", diff 
get_new( current_incident_ count, old _incident_ count) 
else: 
print"[+] No nev, paSS\,\Ord incidents" 
elif not entries: 
get_ ft rst( current_i ncident_ count) 
if name 
main() 
main 
• 
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8.1.7 Harvester for Twitter 
,,�, I· 111 c II' j \ 111, }/ 
import codecs 
import sys 
import tweepy 
1.,liJ t£!1111ir, ,I J.: 
CONSUMER KEY = "--" 
CONSUMER SECRET = "--" 
ACCESS KEY="--" 
ACCESS SECRET="--" 
I 
auth = tweepy.OAuthHandler(CONSUMER_KEY, CONSUMER_SECRET) 
auth.set_access_token(ACCESS_KEY, ACCESS_SECRET) 
api = tweepy.APl(auth) 
def get_accounts(): 
accounts = {} 
\t I 
friends = api.get_user('P,\ nMagic').friends() 
for friend in friends: 
accounts[friend.screen_name] = friend.id 
return accounts 
57 
't 1/ !1< /' I,• �'<'I\ 
deftweets(account, tt): 
/J\/ IJT TY lf)I\ 
tweets_ all = [] 
{\, "/11 /'Ill/\ 
tweets_ al I.append( api. user_ ti mel i ne(id=account, count=200)) 
\I, 11,t1L! II'/ ( ;,, / 
/'1 uJA«J {cl 5 I{\ 'L'/\ ,i,· l l 
request = 0 
while request< 18: 
maxid = tweets_all[request].since_id 
tweets_ all.append( 
api.user _timeline(id=account, count=2011, max _id=maxid)) 
request+= l 
if maxid == tweets_all[request].since_id: 
break 
tf.write("== ( ace l ==\n".format(acc=account)) 
for tweets in tweets all: 
for tweet in tweets: 
tf. write( u' ( t\\ eetl '.format(tweet=tweet.text)) 
tf.write("== End of (ace) ==\n".format(acc=account)) 
tf.write("\n\n") 
I 
58 
!'r,,u,1,1,l ,,f fifh /' il,17< 1,11/1 i11l /,,tfc I 
Ill 
#PastebinLeaks Specific Filter 
for tv\ eets in tv\ eets a II: 
for tv\eet in tweets: 
if any( i in tv, eet.text for i in ['pass'. 'passv\ ord']): 
print"[+] Passv\ord leak:". tv,eet.text 
else: 
#print"[-] Other leak:". t\,eet.text 
pass 
def main(): 
11'<1" !', ,,\f 
accounts = get_ accounts() 
tf= codecs.open('tv\eets_file.txt', \,', 'utf-8') 
IL\ L /11 ( t /S Uf />,, II \f ,<T 
for account in accounts: 
tweets(account, tf) 
if name ==' main 
main() 
- -
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8.1.8 Harvester for Sku11Security 
/{\/ hi11 di\ 1111h,1,, 
- - c't)(/il/� 1/f/-i'\ 
import bs4 
from mechanize import Browser 
de ftlll' I 'Rl 
urls = {'skul !security': 'http://downloads.skullsecurit).org/passwords/'} 
target_tile = open('skullsecurity_ urls. I ist', 'w') 
/1111 
br = Browser() 
br.set_handle_robots( ) 
br.addheaders = [ 
('User-agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (X 11: U: Linux i686: en-US: rv: 1.9.0. I) Gecko/20080716 I 5 Fedora/3.0. J­
l .fc9 Firefox/3.0. I')] 
1't.ltlL\f l cf\1/c 
response = br.open(urls['skullsecurit) ']) 
soup = bs4.Beautifu1Soup(response.read()) 
Ir IL\ t /1L1\S ••,,,.,I t,f 
for each in soup.find_all('a'): 
if"/" not in each.string: 
target_ ti le. write( each.string) 
target_fi le. write("\n") 
60 
